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The paper evaluates spatial, behavioural, and material signal-
ling of social class in African contexts, focusing on Kenya 
and Zambia. In particular, it draws on notions of mode of 
class signalling and intersectionality and a vignette of an 
interaction between urban-based Western educated develop-
ment agents and local participants in rural Kenya to illustrate 
how social class is implicated in interactions. The paper 
shows how significant features of class and dimensions of 
social inequality may be perceived intersectionally so that 
positionalities in class structures are negotiated in contexts of 
interaction, thus illustrating how structural conditions of class 
may be challenged and questioned. The paper concludes that 
sociolinguistics needs to identify the various ways in which 
the marginalized challenge social structures of inequality. 
Otherwise there is a risk that sociolinguistics will work to 
validate inequalities as permanent and fixed, and victims 
of unequal treatment as permanently condemned and never 
able to rise against oppressive social structures that tyrannize 
them.
Kutenga zitsanzo m’maiko ya Kenya ndi Zambia, pepalayi 
yaunika malo, macitidwe, zinthu zakuthupi ndi zipangizo 
zomwe zisonyeza zamakalasi apamwamba ndi apansi. 
Makamaka, pepalayi yatengela malingalilo amacitidwe 
 osiyanitsa anthu m’makalasi, pakati pa ophunzitsidwa 
bwino azacitukuko ocokela m’matauni ndi omwe akutenga 
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1 |  INTRODUCTION
This paper problematizes the complexities of class in African contexts in which Western class systems 
and traditional African social structures are sometimes found existing side-by-side or merged in space 
and interactions. Emergent African leaders at the dawn of independence from colonial powers claimed 
that Africa had a classless society before the colonial era. Kenneth Kaunda’s African Humanism, 
Julius Nyerere’s Ujamaa, and Sekou Toure’s Communaucratique are premised on pre-colonial Africa 
being classless (Cohen, 1972; Mbiti, 1982). Cohen (1972) quotes Nyerere, who said that there was no 
terminology in any indigenous African language to capture the term “class”: “Indeed, I doubt if the 
equivalent for the word ‘class’ exists in any indigenous African language; for language describes the 
ideas of those who speak it, and the idea of ‘class’ or ‘caste’ was non-existent in African society” (p. 
231). These sentiments are framed around the Ubuntu ideology, which was (and is) said to underpin 
African society’s socio-cultural and economic endeavours, and described as working to counteract 
class formations by encouraging kinship solidarity with other human kinds (Ejeolo, 2014; Mbiti, 
1982).
However, discussions around classless pre-colonial African societies should not be reason to ig-
nore various forms of inequality and social stratification seen along dimensions of age, gender, eth-
nicity, chieftaincy, and status groups (such as those with ritual and specialized skills). Young (1986) 
gives the presence of slavery in some West African kingdoms, the subjugation of the Hutu by the 
Tutsi, the caste system in Senegal, and rankings among the Swazi through ancestry as evidence of 
social stratification. Both Nyerere and Senghor counter-argued that the caste system seen in some 
African societies was a result of the Arab-Berber influence (Young, 1986). The issue is that, even if 
the emergent class systems are a result of external influences, this does not nullify their existence. In 
any case, forms of inequalities and social stratification were made much more complex and sometimes 
more difficult to discern considering religious and Ubuntu ideology influences on African society. 
Both appear designed to discourage class-based socioeconomic hierarchies. However, even if African 
nawo mbali kumidzi yaku Kenya, kuti ifotokoze momwe 
magulu ya makalasi osiyana amakhudzila zocitika. Pepala 
yawonetsa kuti kusiyana kwa magawano m’makalasi ndi 
kusalingana kwa cikhalidwe zili muzokambilana za anthu. 
Ici cionetsa kuti magawano m’makalasi angatsutsidwe 
komanso kufunsidwa munkhani zokambilana. Pepalayi 
imaliza ndi kuti, akatswili azilankulo ayenela kudziwa ndi 
kuunikila njila zosiyanasiyana zomwe makalasi omwe ali 
ozunzidwa amapeza kuti angonjetsa zisankho. Kupanda 
kutelo pali ciopsezo kuti akatswili azilankhulo azakhal-
ila a umboni wazabodza kuti anthu ozunzidwa sangathe 
kulimbana ndi kugonjetsa zinthu zopondeleza ndi omwe 
amawapondeleza.
K E Y W O R D S
Africa, class, inequalities, Kenya, marginalization, rural, social structure
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societies were classes, considering their colonial history and current place in the modern world, the 
argument of classless society is difficult to maintain.
If anything, the combination of Western class systems, African traditional social stratification, the 
Ubuntu ideology, and religious and colonial value systems makes the study of class a very complex 
topic. This in part explains why, as illustrated below, Western models of class do not adequately ac-
count for these socio-historically grounded complexities effectively.
The purpose of the paper is not just to illustrate how social class is signalled in time and space in 
African contexts, but more so to highlight how structural conditions of class are mediated, negotiated, 
challenged, and questioned in interactions. The latter is illustrated through an analysis of specific in-
teractions between development workers and rural villagers. It is hoped this will offer useful insights 
for the sociolinguistic study of class generally.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section builds from this section to show why 
Western models of class do not adequately capture the formations of class structures in Africa; it is 
followed by a section outlining the theoretical and analytical framework combining notions of mode 
of social class signalling and intersectionality, and methodological issues. The next section focuses 
on the contrasting modes of social class signals to provide a background for the following section, 
which analyses an interactional event in a development workshop in Kenya. This analysis not only 
demonstrates how class is signalled in interactions between Western-educated, urban-based develop-
ment agents and rural participants, but more significantly, how structural conditions of class may be 
challenged and questioned in that process, thus offering useful insights for the sociolinguistic study of 
class elsewhere. The last section summarizes and concludes the paper.
2 |  CLASS FORMATIONS IN AFRICA
2.1 | Problem of conceptualizing class
Literature suggests the term “class” is difficult to conceptualize and operationalize in African contexts 
(Cohen, 1972; Southall, 2016, 2018; Young, 1986). One reason is that the notion of class has been 
heavily influenced either by rigid Western sociological theories that posit structurally determined 
class categories or by classificatory discourses of international financial institutions. Social and mate-
rialist theories tend to package classes into autonomous categories such as the upper, the middle, and 
the lower classes. However, in African contexts, the boundaries between social classes are not always 
clearly demarcated, as traditional roles and statuses and even the Ubuntu ideologies often blur such 
boundaries.
International financial organizations such as the African Development Bank, the IMF, and the 
World Bank have defined the African middle class as those spending US$2–US$20 per day (Southall, 
2018; Wambui, 2018). Questions can be asked about whether US$2 is enough for one to survive 
on, and whether “middle class” means the same thing in South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and so on. 
It is thus not surprising that recent studies on the middle class in different African countries such as 
South Africa (Southall, 2016, 2018), Angola (Schubert, 2016), Mozambique (Sumich, 2016), Kenya 
(Neubert, 2016; Spronk, 2014), and Ghana (Hamidu, 2015) have come up with different indices on 
what constitutes the middle class.
Southall (2018) has argued that applying in African countries class structure as ascertained in 
European contexts is problematic. First, it does not do justice to the lifestyles and social conditions op-
erating on the continent. Second, using specific criteria set up by international financial organizations, 
for example, to link a person spending US$2–US$20 a day to the “middle class” could be problematic, 
6 |   BANDA
as an individual’s income may be as a result of a combination of several sources: for example, one can 
be a professional white-collar worker, an urban vendor, while at the same time having a farm in the 
rural area for vegetables, maize, or cattle farming overseen by “low class” relatives.
Southall (2018, p. 473) summarizes the African “middle class” thus: “If ‘middle’ means anything, 
it means that ‘middle-class’ Africans are pulled this way and that way by different social forces.” 
From the foregoing, Wambui’s (2018) characterization of the social structure in Kenya into two broad 
categories with fuzzy boundaries, as described below, becomes pertinent.
2.2 | Classifying “those on top” and “those at the bottom”: 
Wabenzi and Wananchi
Wambui (2018) suggests a two-tier class system which consists of (1) what can be called the upper-
middle class “for whom richness, or being a part of the upper class is just around the corner” (p. 1), and 
(2) the lower-middle class, the majority of whom is essentially part of the lower and working class. 
This definition is similar to Sobania’s (2003) demarcation of classes into two: the upper class and the 
second comprising the lower and middle working classes, the jobless and underemployed. This essen-
tially aligns classes into two as in contemporary African discourse. For example, in Kenya, there are 
the haves called the Wabenzi and the have-nots called the Wananchi (Sobania, 2003). Wabenzi was 
originally from colloquial Kiswahili meaning “those who own Mercedes-Benz cars,” a reference to 
the luxurious and expensive Mercedes-Benz car, a symbol of wealth and status. The name came about 
because the Mercedes-Benz limousine was the car of choice for the emergent African politicians and 
elite at the time of independence for most African countries in the 1960s and 1970s.
Although initially used in Kenya to describe politicians and the emerging African elites, the word 
Wabenzi is now used across sub-Saharan Africa. Speakers of any Bantu language will easily decipher 
the word because of its Bantu morphological make up, made up of the prefix morpheme wa- (“of” 
or “owner of” or “having characteristics of”), which is affixed to the root –benz (phonologized to –
benzi to account for Bantu syllable structure). The Wabenzi includes those who drive any expensive 
vehicles, including Sports Utility Vehicles (SUVs), favoured by the rich and famous and development 
agents in Africa, who are the subject of this paper. Wananchi (singular = mu-nanchi) is also a Swahili 
word meaning “ordinary persons/people.” This simplified characterization is convenient for the pres-
ent paper, as it aligns with how ordinary people characterize the haves and have-nots in African coun-
tries. For instance, the alternatives for the Wabenzi and Wananchi in Zambia and Malawi, in the local 
language Nyanja/Chewa, are apamwamba “those on top” and apansi “those at the bottom.” There is 
no word in the local language denoting the middle class. As for the neighbourhoods, the apamwamba 
live ku mayadi “at the yards” and the rest of the ordinary people live ku komboni “the compound.”
Therefore, even though these labels are just as simplistic as the three-way classification of upper, 
middle, and lower class, they offer a glimpse of how the nature and tensions of class are seen on the 
ground.
3 |  SOCIAL CLASS SIGNALLING, INTERSECTIONALITY, 
AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
Kraus, Park, and Tan (2017) suggest that rather than merely defining social class, it is much more pro-
ductive to account for how the intersections in dimensions such as place of residence, income, educa-
tion attainment, and employment prestige (or lack of) shape and position the experiences of a specific 
   | 7BANDA
social class. They maintain that social class should thus be conceptualized “as a ‘bundle of sticks’ 
that can be disaggregated and studied based on its specific elements” (p. 423). Aligned to the present 
paper, the authors theorize that studies on class should account for signalling, that is, how social class 
signals in interactions and space and time create perceptions and experiences of class boundaries, 
and of self and other socioeconomic statuses in society. In this framework, socioeconomic inequality 
is studied through observable elements and “the dynamic observation of observable behaviours that 
signal social class” (p. 423). This semiotic indexing of class is an area in which sociolinguistics can 
contribute to the study of local conceptions of class.
Social class signals, that is, lifestyle statuses (e.g. residing in an upmarket neighbourhood and 
owning expensive SUVs) and behaviours (e.g. standard speech forms) can provide information about 
an individual’s earnings, career or employment status, and other dimensions of social class (Kraus & 
Keltner, 2009; Kraus et al., 2017). Labov’s studies (1972, 2006) on linguistic cues and social strati-
fication have been used to show how language, occupation, level of education, neighbourhoods, and 
house values can individually and intersectionally signal the social class implicated.
The idea of class signalling extends previous sociolinguistic work, including that of Labov, and 
more generally the work on indexicality that considers linguistic and behavioural signs as both reflect-
ing and constituting identities. In this paper’s conceptualization, semiotic indexing of class is multi-
modal and multidimensional. It can be said to be constituted by a constellation of linguistic, cultural, 
and overt and covert displays of semiotic practices and objects, intersecting with social categories 
such as gender, ethnicity, age, religion, and region, to create different positions, stances, alignments, 
and misalignments in constructions of personae in interactions and society. The sociolinguistic focus 
is thus not merely on the patterns of linguistic variations; it is more on the multimodal production of 
signals of class in time, space, and discourse to construct specific social groups. How constructed 
social groups perceive and react to displayed semiotic indexes of class is equally important.
Social groups are not always clearly defined and socially specifiable, a priori, as they are deter-
mined by a cluster of coinciding and intersecting symbolic forms and social categories in time and 
space, and in interactions. This paper emphasizes the need to move our understanding of class beyond 
rigid social structuring emphasized in sociolinguistic and international financial institutions’ literature 
reviewed above, to intersected signs of social class as a way to understand how people position them-
selves and others in terms of social class in society. Unlike Kraus et al.’s (2017) study and other studies 
which focused on how class signals structure and perpetuated class boundaries and socioeconomic 
inequalities, the present paper not only looks at the manifestations of class; it also considers how the 
negative effects of class formations and socioeconomic inequalities may be reversed and counteracted. 
The assumption is that the marginalized do not just accept their low status as a perpetually hopeless 
situation without the possibility for social mobility in terms of status. Some of the observable class 
signals include physical appearance, segments of behaviour, and speech styles, which may intersect 
with other symbols of status in society mentioned above, such as income, place of residence, ed-
ucation attainment, and employment prestige, to signal dominance or deprivation. Such indexical 
resources not only index class, but may also be used as tools to negotiate class relations, including 
reversing and counteracting inequalities.
To account for the fact that class indicators may affect individual members of a social class differ-
ently, I shall also draw on the notion of intersectionality, which grew out of feminist theory. Crenshaw 
(1989) came up with the notion of intersectionality as a way to counter the single axis analysis of the 
marginalization of women. Noting that the intersection of race and gender has a more negative impact 
on black women than white women in the United States of America, she argued that efforts to remedi-
ate race and sex discrimination often erases the experiences of the less privileged of the marginalized 
group. By focusing on the more privileged of the marginalized group, there is a risk that inequality 
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experiences are restricted to a subset of the group and also to the subset of sources of discrimination, 
and thereby obscure what is a complex phenomenon (Crenshaw, 1989).
In recent years, there has been increased interest in the notion in the humanities and social sciences. 
The lens of intersectionality has been used to frame and account for interrelations in complex identity 
options and power relations in everyday life (Block & Corona, 2016; Davis, 2008). It has also been 
used to account for the intersections between gender, language, and transnationalism on the one hand, 
and linguistic ideologies and practices on the other; the roles of contexts in the social production of 
health inequalities (Evans, 2019; Persmark et al., 2019), and the interaction of power relationships, 
social characteristics (e.g. gender, race, ethnicity, class, location, and age), and context-specific expe-
riences of climate hazards (Walker, Culham, Fletcher, & Reed, 2019).
Mindful that there is no agreement on what exactly intersectionality means and that it is concep-
tualized differently by scholars, we shall follow Collins’ (2015) general conceptualization: “The term 
intersectionality references the critical insight that race, class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, nation, 
ability, and age operate not as unitary, mutually exclusive entities, but as reciprocally constructing 
phenomena that in turn shape complex social inequalities” (p. 2). In essence, the notion highlights that 
social inequality is produced by a multitude of intersecting social phenomena, locations, and systems 
of power, and not by a single factor (Collins, 2015; Walker et al., 2019). Aligned to the present paper, 
intersectionality provides an important vehicle for describing complex contexts, specific inequalities 
across specified spaces, social settings and interactions, as a way to furthering anti-subservience ef-
forts towards social transformation and the building of equitable societies (Walker et al., 2019).
The interactions analysed below took place in a Dholuo-speaking rural area in Nyanza province, 
which the UNDP (2005) report characterized as one of the most poverty-stricken areas in Kenya. The 
main data set is from recordings of community development workshops in a rural area of Nyanza 
Province in Kenya, which involved communication between English-speaking, urban-based develop-
ment agents and rural Dholuo mother tongue speakers in rural Nyanza Province (Banda & Oketch, 
2009). The analysis focuses on modes of social class signals in the interactional event between the 
development agents and Dholuo mother tongue speakers considering how such indexes of class may 
both shape the interaction and also serve as a site for contesting class relations themselves.
Before we move into the analysis of the interaction, the next section presents a sample of semiotic 
resources that may be employed in social class signalling in African contexts. Some of the arguments 
are drawn from interviews with two academics: one from Kenya and the other from Zambia.
4 |  MODES OF SOCIAL CLASS SIGNALLING IN SOCIETY
In contemporary Africa, one important signal of social class is where one resides. This is because 
the place of residence might also give an indication of other intersecting social class dimensions, 
such as a person’s occupation and earnings. If one lives in suburbs such as Muthaiga and Langata in 
Nairobi, Kenya, or Ibex Hill and Kabulonga in Lusaka, one is immediately positioned as apamwamba 
“upper class.” On the other hand, if one lives in Kibera in Nairobi, one of Africa’s largest slums, or 
Kalingalinga or kwa-George (“George compound”) in Lusaka, one is associated with the poor and 
working-class people.
The differences in classes between where the upper and lower classes reside are captured in the 
collective names given to neighbourhoods. In Zambia and Malawi, living in a komboni “compound” 
identifies and positions one as belonging to the lower classes. On the other hand, living kumayadi 
“lit. living in a yard” identifies and positions one as belonging to the upper class. The etymology of 
the two contrasting words can be traced to the colonial era. The colonial government and councils 
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built big houses on large pieces of land for white government officials, while Africans working for 
the government as porters, messenger, clerks, etc. were built small houses in cramped spaces called 
“compounds.” In the urban areas of Africa, the arrangement has continued—the difference being that 
the African upper-middle class has replaced the white people.
From the Western characterization of development, rural areas of Africa have remained “undevel-
oped” or “un-modernized.” The upper class is said to be mostly urban-based, while the rural areas are 
mainly populated by the poor and those in need of “aid”—that is, the lower class. In colonial times in par-
ticular, Africans who went to live or had relatives living in urban areas were often seen as apamwamba, 
even though they lived in squalid kombonis in towns. The general characterization of urban Africa as the 
hub of the upper class and rural areas as mostly inhabited by the poor and low class has continued to date.
Education attainment has been lauded as one of the most important indicators of social class and 
is perceived to bridge the gap in equality between those born in a rich family and those from a poor 
family background. Moreover, if Labov’s (1972) study is anything to go by, education would enable 
one to acquire and use speech forms that allow one to inhabit high earning occupations and fuse in 
high status locations. Wambui (2018) describes the Kenyan Wabenzi as taking their children to private 
schools locally or abroad, rather than government schools. In Kenya, there is a question that people 
sometimes ask to illustrate the choice of school as a signal of social class: “Did you go to school to the 
Group of Schools, or did you go to school in groups?” The Group of Schools refers to exclusive private 
local and international schools, some of which offer the British curriculum. Guardians of children that 
go to the Group of Schools can afford a chauffeur or drive their child to school, while the Wananchi 
walk in groups or get into overcrowded matatus “privately owned mini buses,” hence in a group, to 
reach the school. Where one takes one’s children for education is sometimes a more critical factor.
Those who work for international organizations such as UNESCO, JICA (The Japan International 
Cooperation Agency), and SIDA (The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency), and 
international NGOs are perceived to be in the upper social group. As one of the academics interviewed 
for this study comments:
Extract 1
The organization you work for and the job you do … When people say I work for ZRA, 
Zambia Revenue Agency … the UN agency, it can be UNESCO, USAID or NGOs some-
thing like that, people will say “Oh my God!” These are people with money, getting in 
Dollars. They do nothing but talk and get a lot of money.
It is not just that they are often seen in agency-branded 4x4s and SUVs, their salaries are thought to be 
very high and they are paid in stable international currency, which remains strong or even stronger when 
converted to unstable and weakening local currencies.
It is noteworthy that development agents are often drawn from college and university academics 
or highly skilled civil servants, who “rent” out their “skills” to donor agents. Their occupation as 
academics and the English or French speech forms they have mastered are signals of class. That they 
successfully manipulate English or French, the languages in which donor agencies ask development 
proposals to be written to allow them to access funds, only serves to augment their upper-class signals. 
Donor agencies not accepting proposals written in African languages signals that knowledge or edu-
cation in African languages are inconsequential, and hence representing the lower class. That some of 
the development agents do not even speak the local languages does not disqualify them from accessing 
donor funds or doing developmental work. Instead, they drive expensive cars, wear expensive clothes, 
and use English, which they use to mark their class.
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One of the interviewees remarked that some of the apamwambas use their class credentials as a 
license to talk down in English to those that speak an African language as the language of everyday 
interaction. This essentially is done to elevate their status higher while further lowering the class status 
of those that do not understand them.
Some of the signals of class described above, and the idea of English signalling upper-class status, 
which in turn sanctions use of English to speak down to those who speak little or no English, is inter-
esting, as it speaks to the issues and tensions that are critical in understanding the different position-
ings and the role that class plays in negotiations in the next section.
5 |  MODES OF SOCIAL CLASS SIGNALLING 
IN INTERACTIONS
To account for the class positionings and unequal power play constructed in interactions between the 
local people and the development agents, we need to consider the identities, not just of the villagers, 
but more so of the agents; what and who they represent, especially from the perspective of the local 
people. In rural areas, class distinctions are not as marked as they are in urban areas. The rural popu-
lation of Africa is made up of formally (Western) and not-so-formally educated people, retired civil 
servants, and retired corporate workers, all sharing the same spaces. They also all fall under traditional 
chiefs and follow traditional authority and speak mostly the local languages and practise African cul-
ture. The retirees may have used English in their places of work in urban areas, but once living in rural 
areas they revert to using local African languages like other villagers.
The development agents are typically Western educated, with a minimum of a bachelor’s degree, 
but those with a master’s or doctoral degree are preferred by international NGOs and donor agencies 
(Banda & Oketch, 2009). Their Western education has equipped them with the knowledge of how to 
write proposals in the style and language “acceptable” to international donor agencies to access funds 
to organize development workshops in rural areas. Transcripts of degree certification and written 
evidence of knowledge in stylistic and design features of proposals are critical ingredients in deter-
mining whether funding will be granted or denied. Banda and Oketch (2009) and Savage (1997) have 
called development agents “special activists,” for they belong to a special class of individuals able 
to translate mostly English-based donor discourse into the language and discourse palatable to local 
participants and communities. They are not neutral brokers as they represent and carry the ideology 
of the NGOs and international donor agencies and countries. They also represent the apamwamba of 
the country. Leading from this, the unequal power relations between development agents and the local 
participants are all also too apparent. Crack, Footitt, and Tessur (2019) have stated that many develop-
ment agents do not speak local languages spoken in the communities they serve, which has a negative 
effect on their ability to disseminate development information.
As illustrated above, the mere choice of using English is seen as a signal of upper-class status. In 
rural areas where the language is hardly used, its use is particularly marked as it is seen as construct-
ing particular class positions, which intersect with other dimensions of social inequalities outlined 
above. Footitt, Crack, and Tessur (2018) report that using high status language to people who do not 
speak the language makes them feel demeaned and “may create a ‘barrier’ between themselves and 
the community if it is perceived as being disrespectful” (p. 24). This is illustrated in the extract below. 
Participants are expressing their views on the workshop that had just finished on a development issue. 
They were responding to the development agent who wanted feedback from participants on the train-
ing session he had just completed. They explain that the training session failed because they could not 
understand the “academic” English used during the session.
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However, a closer scrutiny of the participants’ response shows that it is more than just being unable 
to comprehend what the development agent is saying. The participants seem to be also responding to 
and contesting the inequalities of class as signalled by the development agent’s appearance, behaviour, 
and language use. The participants find themselves denied of voice and hence in a marginalized posi-
tion, unable to comprehend and engage meaningfully with topics and issues on account of choice of 
unfamiliar language.
Extract 2
Speaker 1: Giruni ber to en too academic made iketnwago e yo mayot nikech jomoko kuomwa o 
lal chon!
“This training is good but is too academic I wish you had some simpler way of doing it 
because many of us are now lost!”
Speaker 2: Puoj ema oremowa ok ni gigi tek to jopuojwa be ok tugnwa tiendgi madi mi wawinj 
gigi e yo mayot.
“We are just ignorant it is not that these things are difficult and our teachers have also not 
made them simple for us to grasp.”
Speaker 3: This thing is looking good but I wish you would put it in Dholuo or even some broken 
Kiswahili then we can benefit a bit.
(Source: Banda & Oketch, 2009, p. 177)
The use of technical language and acronyms by development agents in training and information sharing 
workshops has been identified as a major stumbling block in the development programme (Footitt et al., 
2018). It has social structuring and mystifying effects on the workshop in which the agent is constructed 
as belonging to a knowledgeable class, while the “confused” participants are constructed as “ignorant” on 
issues that they would otherwise understand and discuss without difficulties with an appropriate choice 
of language. It is clear from Speaker 3’s speech form that some of the participants speak English quite 
well. But the kind of English used by the development agent has made difficult a subject which would 
easily have been addressed more efficiently in the local language, Dholuo, or another African language, 
Kiswahili, even “broken” Kiswahili.
In addition to creating a comprehension barrier between the participants and the topic at hand, the 
use of English created a class structure, which would have been avoided or revoked, and renegotiated, 
had Dholuo and “broken” Kiswahili been used. Kiswahili is a language that has no ethnic affilia-
tions, and as such it is a language of choice for East Africans who do not speak and understand the 
same ethnic language, or do not want to evoke ethnic-based status structures. On the other hand, in 
Kenya, “standard” Kiswahili is mainly learnt through the school system. Thus, the use of “standard” 
Kiswahili would also have signalled upper-class status and a knowledge gap.
“Broken” Kiswahili is not just the language of the masses or low class, informal traders, the 
young, and the hip; it is also the language of choice to renegotiate, blur, and counteract the neg-
ative effects of class and status inequalities resulting from dimensions of social structure, such as 
the urban–rural divide and socioeconomic, education and ethnic differences. Although the design 
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features of “broken” Kiswahili can be said to align it with the low class and the young, it is also 
a language that high-status people use to express solidarity and renegotiate (social) role structure 
differences with the masses and thus cushion and refigure the asymmetrical power effects of class-
based inequalities.
During a speech on his first official visit to Kenya in 2015, President Obama appears to have been 
well aware of this. He greeted the people in “standard” English, “standard” Kiswahili, and “broken” 
Kiswahili (called Sheng in Kenya). It was his use of “broken” Kiswahili that got him the applause, al-
lowing him to connect with Kenyans in the way he could not in English or “standard” Kiswahili. This 
is reminiscent of the often-quoted wisdom from Nelson Mandela: “If you talk to a man in a language 
he understands, that goes to his head. If you talk to him in his language, that goes to his heart.” Though 
just a greeting, Obama used a language that Kenyans understood, but which was also at the heart of 
their everyday languaging practices. Thus, he used non-standard Kiswahili to renegotiate the power 
(and class) relations between himself as then President of the USA and Kenyans, and to reposition 
himself as an African just like the Kenyan audience by virtue of his father, who was Kenyan. Thus, 
when he later talked about his Kenyan heritage and about his sisters, brothers, and relatives in Kenya, 
it did not sound hollow. From the Kenyans’ perspective, he was one of them.
On the other hand, the use of English only by development agents forced people into class and 
other positionalities in a manner that Dholuo and “broken” Kiswahili would not. In particular, it po-
sitions those that do understand English as “ignorant” on issues that they could easily comprehend if 
Dholuo or “broken” Kiswahili were used.
It is also noteworthy that “broken” Kiswahili has unrestricted syntax (grammar) and an extended 
vocabulary because it borrows and renovates from English and other European languages, and from 
Dholuo and other Kenyan and African languages. It is the language that local people use to translate, 
interpret, and understand new technological innovations and knowledge, and terminology and com-
plex concepts that are difficult to express in the limited vocabulary offered in “standard” African 
languages and the complexities in the “foreign” and rigidly structured English.
In the above extract, the locals pointing out that Dholuo or even “broken” Kiswahili could have 
been more effective languages for communication of the development agenda means the local par-
ticipants lay claim to how to do development discourse. They come through as more knowledgeable 
than the development agent by teaching the “teacher” what he should have known and done. By 
extension, it also contests the unequal power relationships between development agents and local 
participants, and thus functions to renegotiate class relationships and positions. The contestation can 
be said to be a form of what May (2014, p. 95) calls, in her elaboration of intersectionality, “resistant 
speech and action [that] are not only frequently misunderstood, but often take unconventional forms 
…” Stating that the agent should use Dholuo and “broken Kiswahili” is to turn to the unconventional 
forms of speech and action, which in reality reverses the asymmetrical power in favour of the local 
participants.
The renegotiation of class relationships and positions are evident in the participants’ linguistic 
choices: “This training is good but is too academic,” “it is not that these things are difficult,” and 
“I wish you would put it in Dholuo or even some broken Kiswahili,” which indicate that they 
are more knowledgeable about how to conduct development discourse in a rural area than the 
development agent. This counteracts the class structuring resulting from or indexed by the agent’s 
English use.
As illustrated in the previous section, working for an international donor agency or an NGO 
is seen as a sign of membership to the middle class and English is an important ingredient in the 
construction of this class. Footitt et al. (2018) decry the fact that international donor agencies and 
NGOs only invite applications for funding in English, and not local languages. The development 
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agents in the extract above using English can thus be seen as their representing transnational organi-
zations, a privilege not accorded to the local Dholuo speaking people. The development agents are 
thus implicated in the globally shaped local social structures, which marginalize local communities. 
Like the Philippine and Indian English-speaking call centre agents described by Tupas (2019), the 
development agents can also be said to be implicated in the “local colonially induced class-based 
relations” (p. 537).
It is noteworthy that it is the case that the topics and talking points and the materials used by de-
velopment agents are determined and pre-prepared in urban areas and the headquarters of the donor 
agency. Although it is clear that some of the local participants could have done a better job than the de-
velopment agent—that is, through using the appropriate local language, either Dholuo or Kiswahili, to 
disseminate the development message—they do not belong to the “special activist” class. This means 
they may have excellent ideas on how to enhance development in their communities, but because do-
nors do not allow proposals in their languages (including “broken” Kiswahili), they have no access to 
funding opportunities. In other words, only a particular class has access to funding opportunities, and 
those that cannot present what they want to say in English preferred by donor agencies get no funding 
(Crack et al., 2019).
However, the argument is that directly confronting the development agent and lecturing him 
on how he should have handled the training session illustrates a renegotiation in power dynamics, 
with the local people taking the upper hand, however momentarily. Aligned to this argument, 
Banda and Oketch (2009, p. 178) describe another community development workshop in a Kenyan 
rural area, in which some female participants perceived an urban-based female consultant to be 
looking down on them by the way she held a felt pen and wrote on a flip chart, as another mode of 
class signalling. This resulted in comments in Dholuo: “Who is she showing off to? She thinks we 
don’t know how to write on a flipchart? Mmmh! We live whether she is there or not!” (Banda & 
Oketch, 2009, p. 178). This illustrates the rural female participants’ contestation of what they per-
ceive as the consultant’s performance of urban/modern and Western-educated identity, designed 
to position the rural participants as “illiterate” and uninformed of Western material affordances. 
The argument is that living in a rural area and, perhaps, practising “traditional” African lifestyles 
does not necessarily equate to wholesale “illiteracy” and ignorance of modern gadgetry and how 
to use them.
Therefore, it can be argued that participants identify the semiotic indexes of class as displayed by 
development agents not simply as a reflection of existing class relations but also as an act of reproduc-
ing those relations. These semiotic indexes are seen as symbolic acts of violence against their way of 
life. They assert their independence, and achieve power by rejecting the values, the materialities, and 
the class identities she represents, which they say they can live without. Thereafter, the female partic-
ipants refused to take part in the discussion when prompted by the consultant. Instead, they countered 
in Dholuo: “What can we say you are the teacher just teach us” (Banda & Oketch, 2009, p. 178). These 
rural women can be said to reverse what they perceived as unjustified power performed by her body 
kinesics. They showed their power and voice by not participating any further in the discussion.
6 |  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The paper showed modes of social class signalling, such as place of residence, (types of) vehicles, 
lifestyle activities, food that one partakes in, education attainment, occupation, and so on, may indi-
vidually or collectively intersect among themselves or with other dimensions such as gender, age, and 
the rural–urban dimensions to create differential effects within and across social class experiences. It 
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is the case that those residing ku mayadi “up market neighbourhoods” have more material resources 
and opportunities than those from ku komboni “low class compounds.”
The participants contesting the use of what is supposed to be the prestigious code and speech form, 
elite English, for Dholuo or non-standard Kiswahili goes against rigid structuralist sociolinguistics as 
advocated in Labov (1972, 2006). The participants rebuke the development agent for the violence and 
interpretive silence they suffered due to the English used. They were muted and voiceless “not because 
they … had nothing to say, but because they [were] denied self-representation and [were] wilfully 
misunderstood” (May, 2014, p. 97).
Following May (2014), we see the workshop as a site at which class-based asymmetrical power 
differences converged. It is thus a site of marginalization, violence, and class contestations. In this re-
gard, the paper suggests that, although the body (kinesics) behaviour of the female agent, for example, 
was marked as signalling social class, there were in fact other underlying and intersecting dimensions 
of social stratification in play. The expensive urban clothing she was wearing, the expensive SUV she 
drove to the workshop, and the elite English she used were all being experienced as signals of social 
class that were asymmetrically dominating their own. These intersected with other symbols of social 
status, such as the “flipcharts” and “writing,” all of which were experienced by the local participants 
as positioning them as the “Other,” “ignorant,” and “illiterate” lower class—a marginalized status they 
were unprepared to accept. Thus, they resisted. This was seen in their only commenting in Dholuo and 
refusing to respond to questions asked in English.
From the foregoing, the paper suggests that sociolinguistics needs to identify the strategies that 
the marginalized use to challenge social structures of inequality. Otherwise there is a risk that socio-
linguistics will characterize inequalities as permanent and fixed, and victims of unequal treatment as 
perpetually condemned and never able to rise against the structures that oppress them. Sociolinguistic 
scholarship hazards reinforcing and validating inequalities and marginalization as natural conse-
quences of societal norms, instead of addressing them as problems that have to be addressed to re-
structure and remake the world (Crenshaw, 1989). This could include pointing out breaches and cracks 
in social structures, and identifying strategies that can be used to overcome inequalities and marginal-
ization. Although based on a specific context in Africa, it is hoped that this paper can provide lessons 
for sociolinguistic research on class elsewhere.
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